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Introduction    I
One of the most critical demographic events in the world today is
population aging—the process by which the share of older individuals
in the total population starts becoming larger. The aging phenome-
non, which has been initially experienced by developed countries, is
now steadily approaching the developing world. Projections show that
over the next five decades, world median age will continue to increase,
resulting in enhanced old-age dependency ratios in all parts of the
world. Thus, population aging would be a major global public policy
concern in the 21st century posing unprecedented challenges for
fiscal, monetary, and overall macroeconomic management. 
There is a general consensus that aging population reduces output
growth, limits economic welfare, and lowers employment. One direct
effect of population aging is labor shortages that are caused by declin-
ing birth rates and increasing life spans. This translates itself into a
higher old-age dependency ratio (for example, proportion of popula-
tion aged 65 and older to population aged 15 to 64). Consequently,
with aging, the economy’s capacity to sustain the elderly population
would decline. An important consequence of this development is
reflected in increasing fiscal pressures through higher government
Rakesh Mohan
Fiscal Challenges of Population
Aging: The Asian Experience
299spending on social security, health care, and other welfare programs
for the elderly accompanied by lower tax buoyancy consequent to
falling proportions of the productive labor force. Given the hard
budget constraint for many developing countries, this could mean
lower government spending for programs that primarily benefit the
young. With public pension schemes coming under increasing pres-
sure to raise contribution levels or cut the size of social safety benefits,
the issue of fiscal sustainability is one of the principal challenges
facing policymakers worldwide, particularly in the context of inter-
generational equity. 
The experience of the United States, western Europe, and other
OECD countries suggests that substantial demographic changes have
occurred in the past few decades. Improvements in life standards,
health care, and nutrition have increased life expectancy. As a result,
the old-age dependency ratio in OECD countries is projected to
reach nearly 50 percent by 2050. As has been documented in this
symposium, this is going to pose a huge fiscal burden in terms of
social security, health care, pension, and other related expenditures.
In this regard, an OECD exercise reveals a rise in old-age pension
spending, on an average, by about three to four percentage points of
GDP over the period till 2050. Expenditure relating to health and
long-term medical care is estimated to increase by more than three
percentage points of GDP over the same period. Overall, total age-
related expenditures relative to GDP could rise on average by about
seven percentage points over the period 2000-2050. In turn, this
would imply an average decline of six to seven percentage points in
the primary balance to GDP ratio. 
The economic impact of the decline in dependency ratios is usually
beneficial and is often referred as the “demographic dividend.” Many
developing countries may temporarily experience increase in
economic growth in the wake of a declining dependency ratio. Falling
birthrates would increase female participation in the workforce,
thereby increasing the supply of labor, resulting in higher economic
growth. An additional benefit from smaller families is that parents
300 Rakesh Mohanwould invest more in the education of children. Almost a third of east
Asia’s growth in per capita income between 1965 and 1990 is attrib-
uted to the demographic dividend (Bloom and Williamson 1998).
The impetus to economic growth arising from declining dependency
ratios, however, also depends on government policy. However, many
Latin American countries experienced declining dependency ratios
during the past 40 years without enjoying the rapid economic growth
of east Asian countries. It has been argued that recurrent financial
crises and high trade tariffs in Latin America reduced the size of its
demographic dividend (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2001).        
Given the experiences of the developed (OECD) and Latin Amer-
ican countries, it is interesting to compare those with the emerging
scenario in Asia.  At present, most of the developing countries in Asia
are in the middle path of demographic transition and potentially in a
favorable position on the economic front due to relatively large
working populations. This demographic dividend or “demographic
gift” may not last long, as the Asian population is aging at a faster rate
than global population with rapid improvement in nutrition and
health care (Williamson 2001). The policy options to handle this
problem are wide and varied across countries due to them being in
different stages of the demographic transition. In this context, it is
important to examine whether (a) the experience of Asia will be
similar to that of OECD countries and (b) whether the policy stance
of the developed countries could act as a role model for the develop-
ing ones or a unique/country-specific approach is required.
Against the above backdrop, this paper focuses on the potential
fiscal challenges of population aging in Asia. The impact of this
demographic change is seen primarily from an economist’s (and a
central banker’s) viewpoint. The rest of the paper is as follows. Section
II is in the nature of a digression and presents the conceptual and
theoretical issues. The main focus is on review of the literature on
aging, impact on savings, social security, and pensions. Section III
discusses the demographic profile of select Asian countries, excluding
Japan and Korea, as they are covered under the OECD. Section IV
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system and health care carried out by various Asian countries are also
covered in this section. The Indian experience would be discussed in
a separate sub-section highlighting emerging fiscal developments,
changing demographic profile, fiscal implications of growing pension
payments and pension reforms, and health care. Section V sets out
the policy perspectives in terms of demographic transition, including
lessons drawn from developed countries. Instead of the concluding
observations an approach to Asian aging is presented in Section VI. 
Theoretical underpinnings II
Demographic transition and aging
Demographic transition is, in general, a process of change where
society passes through the stages of high fertility and high mortality
to low fertility and low mortality. Before the start of the demographic
transition, life was short, births were many, growth was slow, and the
population was young (Lee 2003). The shift from high to low levels
of fertility and mortality has been explained through the different
stages in the demographic transition theory. 
The modern transition theory is explained in four stages. In Stage
I, the birth rate was very high and average longevity of life was short;
therefore, population growth was relatively slow and the population
was fairly young. Significant medical advances, better health care
services, higher nutritional standards over the years have resulted in
a drastic decline in mortality in almost all countries and a noticeable
increase in the longevity of life. With this, the transition enters Stage
II. With increase of exogenous survival rates, parents’ family-size deci-
sions changed toward having fewer children. Besides, fertility rate is
also influenced by how economic change influences the cost and
benefits of childbearing. With the advancement of technology and
rapid changes of family structure vis-à-vis the opportunity cost of
child bearing and rearing, fertility decline follow subsequently and
drift downward until it stabilizes at a much lower plane. This is tech-
302 Rakesh Mohannically Stage III of demographic transition. The fourth and final stage
of demographic transition refers to low fertility and low mortality
rates. While developed countries are already in Stage IV of demo-
graphic transition for more than three decades, Asian countries are
passing through Stage II/Stage III, as evident from their trends in
total fertility rates. For example, presently while Pakistan is in Stage
II, India is in Stage III. 
Low fertility and increasing longevity cause a dramatic change in
the population age distribution. An increase in the old-age depend-
ency ratio indicates a situation in which an increasing number of
potential beneficiaries of health and pension funds are supported by
a relatively smaller number of potential contributors. This obviously
imposes heavier demands on the working-age population in order to
maintain a stable intergenerational flow of benefits to the older
people. Given the existing social security arrangements and policies,
the transition toward more elderly people relative to the number of
workers will have pervasive effects on factor and product markets and
will substantially impact on public finances, with important distribu-
tional implications, both between existing retirees and the
working-age population as well as between current and future gener-
ations (Visco 2001). 
Fiscal implications
The fiscal impact of aging population is reflected through higher
government spending on social security, health care, and other welfare
programs for the elderly. With public pension schemes coming under
increasing pressure to raise contribution levels or cut the size of social
safety benefits, the issue of fiscal sustainability is one of the principal
challenges facing policymakers worldwide, particularly in the context
of intergenerational equity. In this regard, the literature on social secu-
rity and pensions has assumed critical importance. 
The principal rationale for mandatory social security programs is
that some individuals lack the foresight to save for their retirement
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and acts as a fiscal burden on several generations, the optimal level of
benefit requires balancing between the consideration of providing
relief to the elderly and the deprived sections of society while mini-
mizing the costs of distorted real resource allocation (Diamond
1977). The issue has been compounded at the present juncture on
account of a variety of factors—namely, (a) increasing proportion of
old people, (b) higher degree of urbanization and greater migration
from rural to urban areas, (c) diminishing support for old people
from families due to changes in family structure, (d) higher rearing
cost of surviving children, and (e) old people require greater resources
and need support for a longer period. As such, the key issue is
whether such support is provided by private or public funding. It may
be noted that the inability of private provision implies greater reliance
on public funding, which is a burden on the fisc. 
In the Asian context, this issue is of great relevance as aging is occur-
ring at lower income levels. The redistribution of resources from
younger to older generations has to be concerned with the incentive
for savings, keeping in view the need for higher investment in sustain-
ing the growth process. In addition to the redistribution of resources
from young to old, there also have to be some resource transfers from
the affluent to the less well off. While the redistribution from young
to old has been traditional and would continue as long as possible for
those who cannot provide for themselves, the transfer of resources
from rich to poor affects incentives. One critical difference between
developed and developing countries is that in the case of the latter, as
income growth is higher, pace of change in the standard of living is
also high, which may be difficult to maintain in old age on the basis
of savings accumulated at a younger age. At the same time, since living
standards are relatively low in developing countries, expectations
about future standards of living are lower. Thus, more inter-
generational resource transfers are warranted for developing countries. 
In thinking about the fiscal challenges arising from aging, the first
question that arises is: Why these problems now? It is true that
304 Rakesh Mohanlongevity has increased tremendously in the past few decades, but
some old have always been with us. What is different now?
In developing countries, and certainly in India, until recently, the
provision for pensions and care for the old was essentially privately
provided and usually within the family. Why is this changing now?
• In rural areas, people essentially worked as long as they could.
There was no retirement age and job content changed according
to capacity to work as people aged.
• With urbanization, in the first instance, the old people get left
behind and remittances provide for pension equivalents, encom-
passing inter-generational resource transfers.
• As urbanization proceeds, the issue of outside family provision
arises and is heightened by labor mobility.
• Earlier, when the retired were essentially expected to live until the
age of 65 to 70, the issue of within family care arose for five to 10
years. This was a feasible burden for the family. Now, with rising
longevity, the within family care could extend to 20 or even 30
years, and with delayed marriage, perhaps throughout the son or
daughter’s full working life. This is difficult to sustain.
Thus, the problems of aging are upon us in developing countries as
well, and certainly in Asia.  We can clearly expect a shift from private
to public provision in the years to come. The issue for public policy
in Asia is how fast this transition will take place and at what pace
should public social security and pension provisions be made, with
the consequent burdens on already stretched fiscal systems.
It has been argued that the provision of social security, particularly
public pensions, reduces the inducement to save, thereby having a
damaging impact on a country’s long-term growth prospects (Feld-
stein 1977). This view has been countered by the multigenerational
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making bequests is evidence enough that they derive some benefit
from the well-being of future generations. Current generations will
therefore find that they need to save less to finance their own old age,
but need to save more in order to increase their bequest sufficiently
to compensate successive generations for their tax liabilities. These
two effects should cancel each other, leaving the savings rate
unchanged. This issue is of particular importance for developing
countries in Asia, which will continue to need high savings for invest-
ment and growth for quite some time.
Against the above background, let me now turn to the issues relat-
ing to aging and the consequent fiscal challenges in the Asian context. 
Aging population profile: Select Asian country experiences III
At present, the total fertility rate is below the replacement level in
practically all industrialized countries. In the less developed regions,
fertility decline started later but has proceeded faster than in the more
developed regions. Over the last 50 years, the total fertility rate (TFR)
declined globally by almost half, from 5.0 to 2.7 children per woman.
Over the next half century, it is expected to drop to the replacement
level of 2.1 children per woman. In this context, it is important to note
that Asia is roughly 50 years behind the developed nations. Within
Asia, a great diversity in terms of demographic transition is noticeable.
As per global estimates, currently the average annual growth of the
older population (60+)1 is 1.9 percent, which is noticeably higher
than that of total population at 1.2 percent (Table 1). More signifi-
cantly, the average annual growth rate of persons aged 80 years and
over (3.8 percent) is currently twice as high as the growth rate of the
population over 60 years of age (1.9 percent). Projected figures clearly
indicate a much higher growth rate of older people in 25 to 50 years
ahead. In terms of percentage, the aged constituted 8.2 percent of
total population in 1950; this percentage rose slowly to 10 percent of
world’s population in 2000 and is projected to rise to 21.1 percent in
2050 (Table 2). During that time, world population of the aged is
306 Rakesh Mohanexpected to exceed the population of children in the age group 0-14
years (Table 3).
The Asian continent, with its large size, wide socioeconomic and
demographic disparities is better understood and interpreted when
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Regions/countries 1950-55 1975-80 2000-02 2025-30 2045-50
World 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.5
More developed regions 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.0 -0.2
Less developed regions 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.0 0.6
Least developed regions 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.0 1.4
Asia 1.9 1.9 1.3 0.7 0.3
Eastern Asia 1.8 1.4 0.7 0.2 -0.3
South central Asia 2.0 2.2 1.7 1.0 0.6
Southeast Asia 2.1 2.2 1.4 0.8 0.4
Western Asia 2.6 2.7 2.1 1.6 1.1
China 1.9 1.5 0.7 0.2 -0.3
India 2.0 2.1 1.5 0.8 0.4
Bangladesh 2.0 2.4 2.1 1.1 0.7
Sri Lanka 2.5 1.6 0.9 0.3 -0.1
Pakistan 2.0 2.9 2.5 1.7 1.0
Indonesia 1.7 2.2 1.2 0.7 0.3
Thailand 3.0 2.3 1.1 0.5 0.0
Malaysia 2.7 2.3 1.7 1.0 0.5
Philippines 3.0 2.7 1.9 1.0 0.5
Source: United Nations, "World Population Ageing 1950-2050,” Population Division, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 2002
Table 1
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studied at country level. Accordingly, selected countries are catego-
rized into three broad groups, as indicated below.2
1.   Indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka).
2.   China.
3.   East Asian Tigers (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand).
The young-old balance of population is shifting throughout the
world. The increasing proportion of aged people is accompanied by a
falling proportion of young people. In developed countries, the
proportion of older people already exceeds that of children, and by
2050 it is expected to be twice that of younger people. What is
notable, however, is that the proportion of working-age people in
developed countries has been roughly constant over the last 50 years
at around 60 percent (Table 4), and has in fact increased slightly with
the float over baby boom. The overall dependency ratio has therefore
not increased (Table 5). The issue of concern in developed countries
is that the proportion of working-age people is now expected to
decline from these levels to about 50 percent by 2050, with the corre-
sponding rise in dependency ratios: Hence, the heightened concern
with aging in recent years in developed countries. What is most
dramatic is the expected rise in old-age dependency (for example,
those in the age 65 plus age bracket as a proportion of the working-
age group 15-64 years). In developed countries it is around 21
percent now, rising to 33 percent by 2025 and as much as 46 percent
by 2050 (Table 6).
The trends in Asia over the next 50 years will be more reflective of
the past 50 years for developed countries, with significant variations
across different countries. The proportion of old people in Asia
(excluding Japan and Korea) today is around 8.8 percent and will
reach 22-23 percent by 2050. However, similar to the developed
country experience of the past 50 years, the working-age population
in Asia is about 60 percent now; it will rise marginally by 2025 and
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Regions/countries 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050
World 8.5 9.9 10.9 15.9 24.6
More developed regions 12.2 16.6 21.2 33.4 46.5
Less developed regions 6.7 7.1 8.2 12.8 21.8
Least developed regions 5.9 5.9 5.8 6.5 9.7
Asia 6.9 7.5 9.2 14.9 26.2
Eastern Asia 7.3 8.2 11.3 21.4 39.3
South central Asia 6.5 6.8 7.6 11.1 20.0
Southeast Asia 6.6 6.5 7.4 12.2 25.1
Western Asia 7.7 8.0 8.0 11.0 17.8
China 7.2 7.8 10.0 19.4 37.2
India 5.8 6.8 8.1 12.2 22.6
Bangladesh 6.2 6.8 5.4 7.8 16.2
Sri Lanka 10.1 6.7 9.3 18.2 34.7
Pakistan 9.4 6.2 6.8 7.9 12.1
Indonesia 6.9 5.9 7.5 12.2 25.8
Thailand 6.0 5.8 7.7 16.4 34.2
Malaysia 9.3 6.9 6.7 13.4 23.8
Philippines 6.8 5.8 6.0 10.1 21.1
Note: The old-age dependency ratio is the number of persons 65 years and over per 100 persons 15 to
64 years. 
Source: United Nations, "World Population Ageing 1950-2050,” Population Division, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 2002
Table 6
Trends in Old-Age Dependency Ratio
and will fall gradually to around 55 percent by 2050. India, Indone-
sia, and other Asian countries will remain between 60 and 65 percent
until around 2050. The expected increase in old-age dependency is
also dramatic: from about 9 percent now to 15 percent in 2025 and
26 percent by 2050, which would be a little higher than that in 
developed countries now. The Chinese, however, are aging faster with
the old-age dependency ratio rising from about 10 percent now to an
expected 19 percent in 2025 and 37 percent in 2050. For India and
Indonesia, the rise will be much slower, whereas the situation in Sri
Lanka and Thailand will be more like that in China (Table 6).312 Rakesh Mohan
What is really different between developed countries and Asia is the
expected trend in total dependency ratio (Tables 5, 6, and 7). The key
fiscal problem of developed countries is the unprecedented rapid rise
that is expected in the total dependency ratio (young + old as a propor-
tion of the working-age groups) from about 48 percent now to 57 in
2025 and 73 in 2050. In 1950, incidentally, it was 54 percent. For
Asia as a whole it was 66 percent in 1950, 56 now, falling to about 49
percent by 2025 and then rising again to 57 percent by 2050, with
differences between countries as expected between China and other
Asian countries. Countries such as India, Indonesia, and others will
continue to reap the demographic dividend for at least another 25
years.
The total dependency ratio is a rough measure of potential social
support needs.3The expected decline is due to the fact that young-age
dependency ratio of all these countries is likely to decrease very
rapidly due to sharp decline in total fertility rate during this period.
However, the decline of young-age dependency ratio during the next
25 years, for example, 2025-2050 for most of the Asian nations, is
expected to be relatively small. 
In view of the declining dependency ratio in Asia, there is greater
room for maneuverability in public finances in terms of social secu-
rity expenditure. A critical issue is the relative emphasis on
expenditure related to the next generation—namely, child rearing
and education vis-à-vis expenditure on the earlier generation on
account of medical and health care.
Old-age dependency ratio of China is likely to increase by almost
four times during the next half century from 10.0 in 2000 to 37.2 in
2050 (Table 7). The other countries likely to have similar trends are
Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Philippines. In the case of India, old-age
dependency ratio during 2000-2025 is going to increase by almost
1.5 times (8.1 in 2000 to 12.2 in 2025); however, the next 25 years
is likely to witness a sharper increase of around 2 times (from 12.2 in
2025 to 22.6 in 1950) (Table 7). Fiscal Challenges of Population Aging: The Asian Experience 313
Regions/countries 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050
World 56.7 63.8 47.5 37.3 33.1
More developed regions 42.2 37.2 27.1 23.6 26.9
Less developed regions 64.3 74.7 52.9 39.7 33.9
Least developed regions 73.8 85.6 80.2 64.9 45.2
Asia 61.4 70.5 47.3 34.1 30.6
Eastern Asia 55.6 65.9 34.9 26.4 26.7
South central Asia 66.9 73.3 58.3 38.4 31.4
Southeast Asia 67.8 77.5 51.5 34.5 31.0
Western Asia 67.5 77.3 60.5 48.0 39.3
China 54.1 70.4 36.4 26.8 26.7
India 67.4 70.6 54.4 33.9 30.0
Bangladesh 64.0 88.6 66.5 42.2 32.8
Sri Lanka 73.6 62.6 39.0 29.6 28.2
Pakistan 66.9 76.8 76.6 56.7 33.8
Indonesia 68.9 74.7 47.7 33.5 31.3
Thailand 77.1 78.6 39.1 28.4 27.7
Malaysia 75.7 77.7 55.2 35.0 30.6
Philippines 82.5 83.9 63.7 36.5 30.9
Note: The youth dependency ratio is the number of persons 0 to 14 years per 100 persons 15 to 64 years.
Source: United Nations, "World Population Ageing 1950-2050,” Population Division, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 2002
Table 7
Trends in Young-Age Dependency Ratio
Globally, the aging index is going to increase rapidly and will triple
over the next half century. Higher increase in the aging index during
the 2000-2050 period is more significant for most of the Asian coun-
tries (see Table 8). This trend may lead to compelling demands for
changes in the way a society’s resources are shared between genera-
tions. The median age of all the Asian countries is expected to increase
by 12 years during the first half of the next century (see Table 9). 
Economic characteristic and determinants of aging
Labor force participation of the older people has declined world-
wide over the last decades (see Table 10). In general, labor force


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eRegions/countries 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050
World 31.9 24.6 19.9 18.8 17.9
More developed regions 23.3 15.0 9.1 8.4 7.7
Less developed regions 40.1 33.9 28.4 25.9 23.9
Least developed regions NA NA NA NA NA
Asia 37.9 32.7 27.2 24.5 22.3
Eastern Asia 30.4 25.8 20.5 18.0 15.6
South central Asia 44.5 39.9 34.6 31.7 29.3
Southeast Asia 51.0 43.4 38.0 34.5 31.2
Western Asia 45.2 34.1 25.2 23.4 21.5
China 29.3 24.0 19.3 16.9 14.5
India 44.1 41.1 34.8 32.1 29.6
Bangladesh 62.5 60.9 50.9 46.6 42.9
Sri Lanka 52.0 30.3 18.7 15.6 13.4
Pakistan 52.3 41.8 33.7 30.1 27.5
Indonesia 58.2 47.0 39.8 35.2 30.8
Thailand 44.4 36.3 28.4 26.1 24.1
Malaysia 40.9 31.6 29.2 26.6 24.7
Philippines 37.0 42.7 42.5 39.1 36.0
Note: The labor force participation rate consists of the economically active population in a particular age
group as a percentage of the total population of that same age group. The active population (or labor
force) is defined as the sum of people in employment and unemployed people seeking employment.
Source: United Nations, “World Population Ageing 1950-2050,” Population Division, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 2002
Table 10
Trends in Labor Force Participation (65+)
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than that of developed countries. However, disparity in labor force
participation among Asian countries persists. Higher labor force
participation of older ages in Asian countries clearly indicates that
old-age support systems in the form of pension and retirement
programs are relatively less prevalent in these countries (as compared
with developed countries). 
Fertility decline has been the primary determinant of population
aging. Fertility of more developed countries with TFR is below
replacement level since the last three decades. The TFR of less devel-
oped countries is twice that of developed countries, and this trend is
expected to continue until 2030. The higher regional differences in
fertility among Asian countries are expected to decrease (see Table316 Rakesh Mohan
11). The projected fertility transition has been relatively smoother in
India and the Philippines. These countries are, therefore, in a favor-
able position (and thus may enjoy the fruits of ‘demographic
dividend’ for a relatively longer period) as far as the inflow of
working-age populations is concerned.
Along with fertility decline, reduction in death rate, especially at
older ages, assumes an increasingly important role in population
aging. Over the last five decades, life expectancy at birth increased
globally by almost 20 years, from 46.5 years in 1950-55 to 66.0 years
in 2000-05 (Table 12). Among Asian countries, there exists a great
degree of variation in life expectancy at birth. However, the extent of
regional variations in life expectancy at birth among these countries
is gradually narrowing. 
Aging population and its fiscal impact  IV
In the last decade, both the IMF (Heller and others 1986, Chand
and Jaeger 1996) and the OECD (1985, 1988, 1996, and 2001) have
carried out a number of studies on the fiscal impact of aging of major
industrial countries. An important objective has been to assess, ex
ante, the potential impact on public expenditure from the provision
or financing of social services and transfers. Normally, the baseline
projections assume unchanged social insurance legislation and social
sector policies by the government. Most studies have concluded that
although outlays on education will decline as a share of GDP, this will
be offset by rapid growth of government outlays on pensions and
medical care. For most industrial countries, the government social
insurance commitments appear to be inadequately funded. Financial
sustainability will be achieved only by a combination of cutbacks in
benefits or an increase in contribution rates. 
Many Asian countries suffer from the chronic malaise of fiscal
imbalances: Expenditures are much higher than government revenue.
As a large section of the population survives at low-income levels, the
tax base is weak and tax revenues are grossly inadequate. Moreover, tax







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are high, resulting in a paucity of resources for capital expenditure.
Hence, deficits are an enduring feature of many Asian economies. 
Public finance in select Asian countries
Based on the classification presented in Section II of select Asian
countries, it may be noted that the average growth (over three years)
in the Indian subcontinent was 4.2 percent, with India having the
highest growth of 5.4 percent (Table 13). Among all the countries
under consideration, China has the highest growth of 7.8 percent.
Among the Southeast Asian Tigers, the average growth is 4.2 percent,
with Indonesia recording the highest growth of 4.4 percent and the
Philippines the least growth of 3.9 percent. 
In terms of domestic savings rates, it is noticed that among the four
groups, the Indian subcontinent has the lowest savings rates on
average of about 17.5 percent. Among these countries, India has rela-
tively higher savings rates of 23.8 percent, with Pakistan having the
lowest rate of 13.7 percent. Among all the countries, Malaysia has the
highest savings rate of 45.3 percent, with China coming a close
second with 41.0 percent. The average savings rate of Southeast Asian
countries is around 30.3 percent, with the Philippines having the
least rate of 21.0 percent. Similarly, investment rates are very high for
China and least for Pakistan. 
On the fiscal side, the fiscal deficit of the government on average
seems to be the highest for the Indian subcontinent (Table 14). The
situation in the Southeast Asian countries is relatively better with
lower levels of deficits. 
Public expenditure on health and education as a percentage of
GDP is among the lowest in the Indian subcontinent (Table 15). In
this regard, it lags behind China and many of the Southeast Asian
counties. Expenditure on education seems to account for a higher
share in Malaysia and Thailand, while expenditure on health draws

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































pensions is dated, the pension burden seems to be quite high for
Malaysia. All Asian countries in general have a low share of pension
expenditure in GDP.   
Fiscal impact of aging
How and when the problem of aging of Asian population manifests
itself will have important implications for the structure of the social
and fiscal policy choices confronting the Asian economies in the
coming years. In terms of timing, the countries fall into three princi-
pal groups:4 (i) the east Asian countries—the most demographically
mature and developed in economic terms, including Korea and
Taiwan, (ii) Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, which has recently experienced significant
declines in fertility and increased life expectancy but where the
further maturing of these indicators can be expected and where per
capita income levels are still relatively low compared with east Asia,
Countries Health Education Pensions
India 1.3 3.1 1.9 1992
Bangladesh 1.5 2.4 2.4 1996
Pakistan 0.9 1.8 0.9 1993
Sri Lanka 1.8 2.2 -
Average 1.4 2.4 1.7
China 2.0 2.6 2.7 1996
Indonesia 0.7 1.4 -
Malaysia 1.6 7.1 6.5 1999
Philippines 1.6 3.7 1.0 1993
Thailand 2.0 5.2 -
Average 1.5 4.3 3.8
Source: Budget documents of central and states governments in India, World Development Indicators
2004, World Bank
Table 15
Public Expenditure on Social Sector in Select Asian Countries
(percent of GDP)
(Average of 3 Years: 2000-02)and (iii) China and the Indian subcontinent, where the aging process
is occurring somewhat later and is far less economically developed. 
The demographic transition reflected in the aging population of
Asia has resulted from the combined effect of successful public health
campaigns and rising income levels. An additional consequence of
these trends toward greater longevity and a broadly healthier popula-
tion has been that there is increasingly a convergence in the morbidity
and mortality profiles of the Asian populations toward those now
observed in the industrial economies. These epidemiological trends
will create pressures for increased spending on medical care in the
coming decades. It will enhance the impact of the demographic
trends, resulting in increasing financial pressure after 2010 in east
Asia and somewhat later in the rest of the countries. In particular,
India is expected to face greater fiscal stress after 2015 (Lee 2003). 
In contrast to the dominant role of governments in the financing of
the social sector in industrial countries, government commitment is
far less comprehensive in Asian countries, with major segments of the
population not covered by social security and many areas of effective
social security are still in the private domain. Public pension systems
exhibit considerable variety in Asia, but a principal characteristic is
the absence (except Korea and Taiwan) of the kind of comprehensive
coverage, defined benefits, pay-as-you-go public pension systems
observed in western Europe and the United States. Some countries
have introduced provident funds, but these are largely focused on
workers in the formal sector. 
The situation in the medical care sector is more varied. Some of the
east Asian countries have introduced comprehensive and innovative
health insurance reforms, with varying degrees of public sector partic-
ipation, that have attempted to nationalize the financing of medical
care. In others, medical insurance coverage is limited primarily to
those in the formal sector, with others in the population obtaining
medical care directly from government hospitals and health centers or
from private sector practitioners. In the education sector, the govern-
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sectors; its provision of tertiary education has typically been quite
limited. This suggests that the question of how much additional pres-
sures for government expenditure will emerge from the aging of the
Asian population may prove to be a question of whether government
policies evolve in the direction of expanded coverage and enhanced
social insurance policy commitments.
Health and medical care
In the context of OECD countries, it has been found that while the
medical expenditure for the entire population would increase by 6.7
times between 1986 and 2025, that of the elderly population is
expected to rise by 10 times during the same period (Dhar
Chakraborty 2004). If the same cost pattern were assumed, there
would be a tremendous shift of resources. In the context of Asian
countries, the main difference is that the problem is likely to be more
acute as aging occurs at lower per capita income levels vis-à-vis OECD
countries because of the globalization of public health measures and
the quality of health care. Moreover, Asian countries have to meet the
dual need of funding higher investment to sustain growth and rising
social expenditure on account of an aging population. However, as
saving rates are expected to continue to be higher in Asian countries,
it may not necessarily inhibit the process of capital formation.
In most Asian countries, long-term medical facilities cannot be met
through regular market service providers. Provision of such services
through community-based schemes will only add to the financial
burden. Moreover, old-age family care schemes are an additional
burden. In addition to the financial resources, population aging is
likely to demand a great deal of human resources in terms of doctors,
nurses, and other medical personnel and infrastructure on medical
facilities to deal with an aging population. Moreover, shift in disease
patterns further compounds the problem in Asian countries. In addi-
tion to infectious diseases, malnutrition, etc., Asian countries are also
faced with the growth of noncommunicable diseases, which strain the
322 Rakesh Mohanalready scarce resources to the limit. Therefore, considerable expendi-
ture on medical care is required to pursue efficient and effective
health care programs to tackle both communicable and noncommu-
nicable diseases.
Reforms  
The role of the government in the health and medical care sectors
of the Asian countries is quite varied. At present, most Asian coun-
tries spend about 5 percent of their GDP on health, as compared with
14 percent in the United States and other developed countries. Since
aging is not yet a major issue, the developing countries of Asia are yet
to develop special health care programs for the aged. Since govern-
ment expenditure on health care is not adequate, most Asian
countries have income elasticity of health care above one. 
Most of the east Asian countries have introduced health insurance
reforms that seek to rationalize the financing of medical care in order
to cope with the changing pattern of medical demand and use market
principles to contain costs. The medical insurance programs in Korea
and Taiwan have nearly universal coverage, while it is substantial in
Singapore. Funding is largely derived from a combination of
employer and employee contributions, budgetary transfers, and direct
co-payments by patients in both public and private sectors. Although
most schemes are formally in the private sector, they involve some
degree of public regulation or management. However, their financial
operations are not included in the government’s budgetary accounts.
In China, on the other hand, medical insurance effectively covers
about 20 percent of the population. Among these, the maximum
benefit accrues to workers in the civil service mainly in the urban
areas. However, no more than half of the urban population is under
a formal medical insurance scheme. For 75 percent of China’s popu-
lation that lived in rural areas, only 5.4 percent were covered under
collectively financed cooperative medical care systems in the early
1990s (Hsaio 1995).
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provide medical services through government hospitals and health
centers. Outlays have been financed directly from the budget and, to
a lesser extent, from user fees. Fiscal restraint has resulted in inade-
quate medical facilities in urban centers and more limited primary
care facilities in rural areas. Over time, the private sector has grown
in significance. Only in Indonesia and the Philippines is a more
extensive medical insurance system being gradually developed. In
Indonesia, since 1993, a compulsory health insurance scheme is being
introduced gradually for all workers, with contribution paid entirely
by employers, although the coverage is restricted to civil servants and
formal sector workers. In the Indian subcontinent, medical insurance
and health care reforms is at a primary stage with the principal
medical facilities located in the urban areas. Although there is a large
contingent of private practitioners, they are mainly city based and the
per capita availability of medical care in rural areas is quite low. 
The financial effect of aging populations is significant in the
medical care sector. Focusing initially on the east Asian countries,
which are the most mature in terms of age distribution and health
insurance system, demographic factors would suggest that gradual
increases of about 10 percent might be expected per decade in the
ratio of medical expenditure to GDP. While medical expenditure in
Korea and Taiwan could rise to about 9 percent of GDP by 2025,
China and Southeast Asia would not have a significant impact until
at least 2020 (Heller 1997). In east Asia, government budget outlays
would rise on average by only 0.2 percent of GDP by 2010 with
somewhat more substantial increases in the successive decades. In
China, pressure on government outlays would emerge after 2020
with the expenditure share rising by less than 1 percent of GDP by
2050. In Southeast Asia, government medical care outlays as a share
of GDP would barely change over the next 50 years (Heller 1997). 
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In Asian countries, the government’s involvement in the education
sector has been most extensive in terms of primary schooling, where
enrollment rates are virtually universal. It is also the principal
provider of secondary education, though here the private sector plays
a more significant role in some countries (notably, Indonesia, Korea,
and India). Secondary enrollment rates, which typically range from
40 to 75 percent, while high by developing country standards, are
significantly below the average rates of 86 percent observed in more
developed countries. Government involvement is far lower in the
tertiary sector (with the exception of Korea). Private sector involve-
ment, either through private universities (so-called long-distance
training), or the acquisition of education at oversees universities, is far
more common at this level.  
The absolute size of the school-age population is projected to grow
by a limited extent in Southeast Asia (Heller 1997). In China and east
Asia, this group will fall in size, suggesting the possibility of some fiscal
savings. Since public spending on education is typically 2-4 percent of
GDP, it is plausible that reductions in government expenditure are
non-trivial. Projections suggest that government expenditure on
education could fall by about 1 percent of GDP by 2010, with more
modest reductions thereafter by 2025. In China, only modest reduc-
tion in government educational spending—less than 0.4 percent of
GDP will be observed through 2010 and only slightly by 2025 and
thereafter. If enrollment rates in higher education were to increase to
20 percent, overall government outlays on education is likely to
increase. Overall, the potential reduction in education expenditure
may be muted because of the elongation of time spent in education
and greater emphasis on technical and professional education,
improvement in the quality of education, all of which will be very
necessary for the productivity growth that is necessary for economic
growth and improved standards of living in Asia.
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Perhaps the most significant impact of population aging is on the
pension system, in particular, and on the fiscal situation, in general.
The choice of policies for stabilizing the fiscal situation is therefore
important, especially if the governments decide to pursue a somewhat
faster pace of consolidation to reduce its exposures to fiscal risks.
While one option is to shift toward fully funded pension liabilities
and more generally encouraging a diversified range of retirement
income sources, another option is modifying public pension generos-
ity and eligibility criteria by elongating the average numbers of years
in the workforce or service. In this regard, the pension reforms have
taken the form of both structural and parametric changes. The
reforms in many countries have focused on the more from unfunded
to funded arrangements in order to address the issue of growing
pension liabilities. This has led to the creation of large sized pension
funds, necessitating appropriate institutional frameworks to ensure
safety of invested funds.     
Public pension systems exhibit considerable variety among the
Asian countries. Only Korea and Taiwan have defined benefit, pay-
as-you-go, public pension systems with largely universal coverage of
the workforce. Taiwan’s scheme (which was expanded in 1983) results
in a lump-sum benefit upon retirement, in contrast to Korea’s more
recently introduced scheme, which will result in a retirement annuity.
Coverage is relatively comprehensive for the mandatory provident
funds of Malaysia and Singapore. These are defined contribution
schemes, which result largely in lump-sum withdrawal benefits upon
retirement, but which allow earlier withdrawals for specified purposes
(for example, higher education for dependents, major medical
expenses, housing). The latter schemes are subject to government
regulation or management (in terms of governance provisions and
investment policies). The provisions of the systems suggest that the
principal risks of inadequate savings (due to unanticipated inflation,
poor yield on savings, or longer-than-expected-life spans) are almost
wholly borne by the contributing populations (Heller 1997).
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pension sphere is presently much more limited, although some coun-
tries are considering or have recently implemented pension reforms
that seek either to introduce new pension schemes or to strengthen
the finances of existing schemes (for example, in Indonesia). Public
pension systems, if they exist at all beyond the civil service, are typi-
cally restricted to the larger enterprises in the formal sector. Thus,
overall public pension coverage of the labor force is still fairly limited
and replacement rates are low. Where such schemes exist, they are
managed by public enterprises and are financially not included in the
central government budget. Private sector pension systems exist for
the larger enterprises of some countries (notably, China, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand), and most of these are in the form of
provident funds.
There are few estimates of the impact of demographic trends on the
pension outlays of the Asian economies. For those countries where
pension coverage is relatively comprehensive, long-term actuarial
projections are available for some of the pension schemes, and these
indicate the financial pressures to which they may be subjected. In
Korea, for example, actuarial projections show the emergence of oper-
ating deficits in the National Pension Fund as early as 2020 or sooner.
For the provident fund-type schemes of Singapore and Malaysia,
projections suggest that the aging of the population will also result in
a net draw down on fund reserves. To the extent that these funds are
classified in the private sector, these draw downs would have no
impact on measured government fiscal balances (Heller 1997). 
For other Asian Tigers, most of the public sector pension schemes
cover only a limited share of the labor force. Thus, most long-term
financial projections, where available, focus on the demographics of
the specific work process associated with particular pension schemes
and on the terms of eligibility for benefits in these schemes. The few
available financial projections suggest the exhaustion of built-up
reserves within the next decade or so, and mounting operating
deficits thereafter.6 In the absence of the governments being drawn
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into their financing, the deficits of these schemes would, in principle,
need to be financed either by higher contribution rates from future
workers or by cutbacks in benefits. Obviously, developments in the
size and demographic structure of the overall population are not
useful for assessing the potential pressures on public outlays from
these pension schemes. Indeed, one may observe operating deficits
emerging in schemes, even where the overall demographic data for a
country would not suggest any particular pressure in terms of rising
overall elderly dependency rates.     
An alternative perspective on the implications of demographic
change can be gleaned by a simple assessment of the effect of an
increase in the size of the elderly population rate on gross public
pension outlays (Heller 1997). In east Asia, through 2010, the effects
on government pension outlays are modest (1-2 percent of GDP),
with the largest impact felt in Korea and Taiwan, and with far more
limited effects in Singapore, Hong Kong, and China. Outlays in
Taiwan and Korea could also rise substantially, by about upward of 4
percent of GDP between 2010 and 2025. By 2035, these expenditure
shares could further increase as the elderly dependency rate becomes
larger. Indeed, by 2050, one could observe pension outlays increasing
by 8-11 percent of GDP in Korea and Taiwan relative to 1995 levels.
In China, the budgetary effects only emerge between 2010 and
2025, but still remain modest, with additional outlays of about 2
percent of GDP between 1997 and 2025. Thereafter, however, demo-
graphic factors alone could increase government pension outlays by 5
percent of GDP by 2035. For the Southeast Asian Tigers, again the
budgetary impact would be negligible for most countries (an increase
under 1 percent of GDP by 2025 and 2 percent by 2035), with the
significant exception of Malaysia.
The implications of enhancing pension coverage
Beyond the obvious differences across countries as to when the
elderly dependency rate will become burdensome, the key factor
determining the impact on outlays are differences in the scale of thegovernment’s budgetary involvement in the pension sector. However,
the statistics also implicitly suggest significant differences across
economic groups within a country in terms of their claim on formal
pension incomes during retirement. The populations not covered
under such schemes are typically those in the informal and rural
sectors who are almost wholly reliant on intra-household transfers
and savings. They are likely to be far more vulnerable to the financial
risks of aging.
Were the governments of these countries to play a more active role
in the pension sphere in terms of ensuring some minimal pension to
all uncovered elderly, government pension outlays could become
more substantial. For example, if in 2025 the government were to pay
a pension equal to 30 percent of per capita income to each elderly
person not covered under existing public pension schemes, then
government pension outlays would rise significantly. In China, a
further increase in outlays of 1.7 percent of GDP would be required
as early as 2010, and the pressure on pension outlays would become
increasingly heavy. In Southeast Asia, outlays would be higher than in
the previous projection by about 1-1.5 percent of GDP by 2010, with
further additional increase thereafter.
Two broad sets of issues are clearly on the public policy agenda. First,
where existing schemes for public enterprise employees and civil
servants (for example, in China, Indonesia, India, and Thailand) have
been shown to be actuarially in need of remedial financial measures,
the issue is whether the government will adapt these schemes to fore-
stall such a situation or ultimately absorb the cost of operating deficits.
Second, and more important, are the problems posed by the aging
of the populations of the Southeast Asian Tigers and China, with
reduced support ratios in terms of the number of workers relative to
the elderly population, and an increasing breakdown of traditional
extended family support systems (particularly in the context of signif-
icant rural-urban migration and declining fertility rates). Will these
societies decide to provide a more organized financial framework for
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household savings decisions and extended family support? To a signif-
icant extent, this is a distributional question. The policy choices made
in this regard will have both fiscal and macroeconomic implications;
both in the period before and after the elderly become an increasing
share of the population. The choices will also determine the way in
which the financial pressures from an aging population are distrib-
uted within the societies.
The Indian scenario
The case for fiscal consolidation in India is very strong, given that
the existing nominal debt to GDP ratio is already very high compared
with other emerging market economies. The burden is further aggra-
vated when unfunded pension liabilities, contingent liabilities,
government guarantees of state enterprise debts, and the prospects of
re-capitalization of a number of state-owned financial institutions is
taken into account. The combined fiscal deficit has been around 10
percent of GDP in recent years. The challenge facing India therefore
is a renewed focus on fiscal consolidation, as is embedded in the objec-
tives of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act that has
been enacted recently.  As the fiscal challenges arising from aging will
take some time to become evident, the opportunity of strengthening
the fisc is new and needs to be pursued with great resolve.
An overview of the combined finances of the central and state
governments shows some improvement in 2003-04 on account of a
lower growth rate in aggregate expenditure vis-à-vis non-debt
receipts. The combined tax-GDP ratio registered an improvement of
0.5 percentage points over the previous year’s level. Direct and indi-
rect taxes registered improvements over the previous year’s level; the
improvement in direct taxes was, however, more pronounced as a
proportion of GDP. There was also qualitative improvement in
expenditure composition in 2003-04, as reflected in a shift in favor of
the developmental component. In terms of GDP, the development
expenditure of the center and states exhibited an improvement of one
330 Rakesh Mohanpercentage point over the previous year. The share of capital outlay in
the total expenditure showed an improvement in 2003-04 by 2.6
percentage points. Containment of non-developmental expenditure
was made possible through reductions in interest payments on
account of the softening of interest rates enabled by the conduct of
monetary policy. The impact of the lower interest rates was reflected
in the decline in the ratio of interest payments as a proportion of
revenue receipts. 
India is undergoing the same forces of demographic transition that
have been experienced in most other parts of the industrial and
emerging market world, delayed by a few decades. Population will
continue to grow in the next 50 years, albeit at a lower rate. The age
structure will change dramatically, with a doubling of the share of
aging population. In fact, India’s population structure will, in 2050,
mirror that presently found in the major industrial countries. 
Fortunately, from the fiscal point of view, unlike in industrial coun-
tries, India does not have a “Beveridgean” social insurance system in
place. Thus, India’s demographics do not necessarily portend explo-
sion in government social insurance outlays arising from underlying
existing policy commitments. This being the case, the demographics
still pose important challenges on social security for the government. 
India’s demographics have important ramifications for the approach
taken to the provision of medical care and the structure of India’s
evolving social insurance policy framework. Although, they do not
necessarily imply a dramatic expansion in the size of the government
health care system, the need for a substantial strengthening of both
this system and the regulatory framework in the sector cannot be over
emphasized. Even without a national health insurance scheme, the
level of primary care expenditure is grossly insufficient and would
required at least a doubling of the share of this expenditure in GDP by
2010 (Heller 2004). Moreover, with an increasingly affluent popula-
tion, the demand for medical care is expected to rise sharply. 
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tion of public and private pension schemes is primarily determined
by a combination of the demographics of the insured population of
the scheme and the nature of the policy parameters of the particular
pension scheme. In the case of India, only about 11 percent of the
current working-age population participate in mandatory, formal
programs designed to provide income security during old age. The
participants in these schemes—salaried employees in the formal
private sector and government—are among the highest income
groups in India. These schemes do not extend to nearly 85 percent of
workers in the informal sector who have little ability or opportunity
to save for old age. The formal programs consist of three funded
programs, two of which are of a defined contribution nature (namely,
the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) for formal private sector
employees and the government-wide provident fund—the Govern-
ment Provident Fund) and one which is a defined benefit scheme (the
Employees’ Pension Scheme (EPS). There is also one unfunded
program—the Civil Servants Pension Scheme (CSPS), which is a
non-contributory, pay-as-you-go pension system administered by
both the central and state governments. For two of the schemes, the
CSPS and EPS, the government is likely to face significant long-run
contingent liabilities. The situation is difficult in the case of central
government departments’—namely, defense and railways. The
pension bill is estimated to be about 25 percent above the wage bill,
which represents a hidden cost. 
Although the EPS is, in principle, funded, it is unlikely that it is
going to be financially sustainable in the long run, as its defined benefit
promises too high a rate of return on contributions. This rate of return
is well beyond the feasible rate under the current restrictive investment
regulations and approximates the rate that can be expected from a well-
diversified portfolio in the most advanced financial markets. Increasing
coverage simply increases the number of the workers accruing unaf-
fordable benefits. As interest income and lump-sum withdrawals from
provident funds is tax exempt, tax preferences in the current pension
system add to the strain on government finances. 
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on small savings, which are not in sync with market interest rates.
While increasing attention was given by the monetary authority to
explore alternative means of reducing the interest rate rigidities, sharp
reductions in interest rates since 2001 following strong capital inflows
raised concern about protecting real interest income of retirees and
pensioners, particularly in view of inadequate coverage of social safety
net in India. Therefore, while benchmarking of interest rates may be
an interim solution, a medium-term objective could be to design fully
funded pension schemes over a period of time to be independently
managed by professional trustees with returns linked to the underly-
ing assets of the fund. In order to address the immediate concerns of
savers, it is necessary to limit the inter-year movement of interest rate
fluctuations within tolerable levels. In fact, these concerns supersede
the need for aligning the administered interest rates to market rates.
Further, it is also envisaged to offer a higher interest rate to senior
citizen/pensioners by benchmarking those securities with government
securities (G-sec) of longer activity and adding a spread over the
benchmark (government of India 2004).   
A cursory review of India’s social insurance framework (Box 1)
suggests enormous gaps, both in coverage and in the regulatory struc-
ture. Unemployment insurance basically does not exist, adding to the
factors that have made it difficult for enterprises to rationalize work-
forces. In the health sector, most of the population is covered at best
by a limited and poorly staffed public health service. As a conse-
quence, the bulk of health care is provided by the private sector. And
finally, as discussed above, the various formal retirement savings
schemes cover no more than about 11 percent of the labor force
(Heller 2004). Looking ahead, India will need to develop a frame-
work for provision of mechanisms for social insurance consistent with
a modern economy. While the private sector has to play an important
part in extending social security services, there has to be a dominant
role of the public sector in both regulation of the private sector and
in the targeting of the poorest groups.
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The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, government
of India had commissioned a national project, titled “OASIS”
(Old Age Social and Income Security) in 1999 to examine policy
questions connected with old-age income security in India and
create necessary institutional infrastructure and to make concrete
recommendations for actions. The committee, which submitted
its report in February 1999, was entrusted with the twin task of
further improving existing provisions and to devise a new pension
provision for excluded workers who are not capable of saving even
modest amounts and converting this saving into an old-age
income security provision. Major recommendations of the
committee were:
To develop an institutional infrastructure through which individ-
uals can prepare for old age while they are in the labor force is an
efficient pension system. As most individuals in India are outside
the organized sector and face temporary unemployment, a pension
system for India should thus be flexible and useful to the unorgan-
ized sector. Government dole is not sustainable on a significant
scale and old-age economic security should necessarily result from
sustained lifelong contributions by emphasizing self-help and
thrift, and for sound pension planning, there should be sound fund
management to achieve the highest possible rates of return. 
The enduring message for Asian countries, based on the experience
of developed countries, is that dependency and its concomitant fiscal
impact is not necessarily toward old age but also for the younger
generation. While the expenditure on education can be funded by
private provisions, that of health and medical care of older people are
likely to come from public spending on social security. Thus, aging
poses serious challenges on the fisc, which require immediate policy
responses.  In this regard, public pension reforms and health insur-
ance would play a key role in alleviating the fiscal burden.
Box 1
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Box 1 (cont.)
The committee recommended a simple and convenient pension
system where a person opens a single Individual Retirement
Account (IRA) at as early a point in his or her life as possible with
a minimum of Rs.100 per contribution and Rs.500 in total accre-
tions per year.  No limit on the frequency of accretions or fixed
monthly contribution.
The pension system would work through a myriad Points of
Presence (POPs), which would be located all over India, including
banks, branches, the post office, etc, with full portability across job
changes and across geographical locations. It would be a two-tier
system where POPs with good information technology and
telecommunications facilities would offer better services than other
technologically constrained POPs and in turn would reduce
administrative and transactions costs. 
Six professional pension fund managers (PFMs) should be
selected to manage the retirement funds under this system.  The
pension system would offer three styles: safe income, balanced
income, and growth. Each of the six PFMs would run one scheme
each in the three styles, giving 18 schemes in all, which individu-
als can choose from. 
An additional safety net in the pension system is that if the final
pension of a participant is smaller than the sum total of all contri-
butions, then the insurance cover would reimburse this difference
for individuals who have contributed for at least 10 years. To a
significant extent, the government can purchase this insurance
from insurance companies. 
The design of the pension system should also include a self regu-
latory organization (SRO) that will be registered with the Indian
Pension Authority. The pension system relies on annuity providers
who convert the lump sum of assets (attained at retirement) into a
regular monthly pension (or a variable annuity) until death.  336 Rakesh Mohan
Policy response and lessons from developed countries  V 
Population aging has many serious developmental linkages with a
potential to jeopardize economic and planning strategies. Normally,
the subject is viewed as a problem in the very long run; therefore,
policy initiatives receive only peripheral attention. However, while
addressing the magnitude and timing of the adverse demographic
fallout, there is a need to reflect on the likely direction and effects of
critical policy choices in the social sectors, many of which initially
have only a limited relationship with long-run demographic pres-
sures. These pressures later will eventually play an important role in
determining longer-term fiscal effects. In reflecting on the options
faced by the Asian countries, it is useful to look at the debate in
industrialized countries, where the focus has largely been on three
broad sets of options. These are: 
1.  Measures for fiscal consolidation in the period before the full
impact of aging commences, thus improving the base level of
national savings and public debt. Actions to lower expenditures
and raise primary budget surpluses in the non-age-sensitive areas
of budgets are clearly seen as strengthening this fiscal position. 
Box 1 (cont.)
The tax-free limit for accretions into the IRA should continue to
be a maximum of Rs.60,000 per year. Premature withdrawals as
well as the terminal accumulations withdrawn as a lump sum from
provident funds should be taxable at the rate of long-term capital
gains rate. However, the amount that is used for buying annuities
should be tax-free.  
The income earned on funds held in trust by PFMs and annuity
providers, on behalf of contributors, should be exempt from any
taxes.  There is a strong case for integrating a micro-credit facility
into the pension system whereby individuals can have access to
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2.  Fundamental changes in policy design, particularly in the health
and pensions sphere, in order to contain the cost of the public
sector’s social insurance commitment to the elderly population
and to contain systemic cost-augmenting pressures in the medical
sector; and
3.  Measures designed to at least partially redress the influence of
demographic trends on the workforce and thereby enhance
growth rates and the government’s revenue potential. 
The position of the Asian economies in the face of these choices of
policy design in the key social sector differs in some important
respects. For the industrial countries, the scope for significant policy
changes is restricted by the maturity of their pension and health
systems and the consequent difficulties of changing them. In
contrast, the social service systems of many of the Asian countries are
still in a formative stage. This is particularly true for India and China,
where fundamental reforms to both the health insurance and pension
systems are now under consideration. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages in this situation. On
the one hand, the problem of aging is a bit premature for many Asian
economies (for example, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) while for
some it is getting too late (for example, Korea and China). There is a
need to ensure that stable systems are put in place by the early part of
this century; but, at the same time, these systems have to be suffi-
ciently flexible and moderate in their commitments on pension
benefits. Secondly, in designing present policies, the longer-term
demographic developments have to be borne in mind, although there
may be more pressing fiscal problems at hand. Third, in view of the
rapid pace of transformation of an aging population, there is a need
for policymakers to adequately modulate the speed of adjustment of
reforms. Finally, although policy strategies are highly reliant on
private sector initiatives, the public sector has to play an important
role in overcoming sources of market failure. 338 Rakesh Mohan
Many of the issues that will confront public policymakers are essen-
tially distributional in character. For example, should there be a
minimal income level for the elderly and who should finance such
transfers? There has to be some reassessment of the generosity of some
existing pension schemes and measures to alleviate the gender bias
inherent in some pension schemes. In the area of medical care, poli-
cies have to address the issue of whether access to medical care should
be governed by financial ability. Finally, the question of whether to
broaden social security coverage beyond the formal sector to the
informal economy, the rural sector, and the foreign workers commu-
nities will be a significant policy issue for most of the Asian countries
during the next few decades. 
In terms of allocation of scarce resources, expenditure within the
social sectors needs to be prioritized to take account of the changing
structure and level of demand in education and medical sectors.
While some levels of education need to see expansion, others will
need downsizing. Similarly, medical facilities have to be upgraded,
which calls for heavy capital outlays. 
One issue that will influence social insurance system design is the
capacity of the government or the private sector to extend the admin-
istration of collections of payroll-related contributions or taxes to the
rural and urban informal sectors of the economy. The administrative
complexity of taxing or realizing mandatory contributions from such
groups will thus inevitably bias policy choices away from the notion
of benefit systems that are tied to individual contributions and more
toward the provision of publicly financed services in the medical care
sector and rough means-tested safety net transfers for the elderly. In
effect, cross subsidization from the general taxpayer to these groups,
which are not an insignificant share of the population, may be
inevitable for the foreseeable future in Asia. This may reinforce the
bias toward dualistic systems, which effectively differentiate between
workers in the formal and informal sectors. Allowing for optional
participation in public pension and private or public medical insur-
ance schemes is also an obvious option, but does not address the
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segmentation of the population in terms of the standard at which
pension and medical care needs are addressed.   
A second issue is whether the Asian countries need to alter their
fiscal stance in light of emerging demographic trends. In the pension
sector, this would imply whether it would be desirable to prefund
higher outlays associated with pension, as in Singapore and Malaysia
or as with Medisave in Singapore for medical care. Ultimately the
question relates to whether a higher national savings rate is desirable,
and the extent to this should be an explicit goal of policy. This is
particularly true for east Asia where the aggregate and public sector
savings rate are quite high and where even higher investment rates
have fueled higher economic growth and rising per capita income.
For the less developed Tigers, the financial implications of aging
population are less daunting for the foreseeable future. For these
countries, achieving high rates of savings would appear an important
policy objective, but more so in order to achieve the rapid growth
necessary for raising per capita income levels. In effect, achieving
rapid growth is one form of “prefunding.”
Yet another issue is the availability of life insurance and private
pension schemes in Asian countries. Asian countries, particularly in
the Indian subcontinent, suffer from scarcity of capital, which
restricts their capacity for large capital outlays in infrastructure.
Pooled savings of pension and insurance schemes can be channelized
for productive investments, thereby increasing the potential for
higher growth. Higher growth would enable higher investments in
social security, as the scope of additional mobilization of resources
through higher taxes is limited. These measures would facilitate the
burden of an aging population without inhibiting the development
process, while maintaining inter-generational equity. 
In order to postpone the burden of pension funding, another policy
option may be to increase the retirement age for existing employees
(for example, Japan), thereby keeping elderly people employed for a
longer period. In this regard, incentive schemes for early retirement
may be withdrawn or discontinued. However, while this may be a340 Rakesh Mohan
feasible solution in developed countries with low growth rates of
population, such measures in Asian countries, experiencing high
population growth, would result in increased unemployment, as
more job seekers would remain unemployed for a longer duration. 
Pension reforms
In the context of growing pension liabilities, several countries have
initiated modifications in the civil service pension schemes. Many
countries have, accordingly, taken measures to reduce the pension
liabilities by introducing higher retirement ages and/or longer service
periods, increasing required employee contribution rates, lowering
rates of benefit accrual, and changing the post retirement indexation
policy. Illustratively, Korea has increased the employee share of contri-
bution, shifted from wage to price indexation, and reduced the
benefit levels to new employees. Italy also shifted from wage to price
indexation and introduced limitations on early retirement. Brazil,
Greece, and Portugal have also reduced the benefit accrual rates. A
number of countries have also realized the need to achieve some level
of advance funding of benefit obligations.  
Pension reforms being undertaken by various countries follow
different forms. The multi-pillar system adopted in several countries
consists of an unfunded mandatory pillar, a funded mandatory pillar,
and a voluntary private pillar. The design of the pillars has varied
across the countries. There are, however, three major types of pension
reforms across the world. At the one end of the spectrum is the Latin
American (individual account) model, with only one DC pillar estab-
lished by Chile in 1980 and now followed by Argentina, Mexico,
Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. While the other two models are the
OECD (employer sponsored) model adopted by Australia, Switzer-
land, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, and the national defined
contribution (NDC) system, which originated in Sweden and was
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Given the wide variety of demographic experience in Asia, the
sequencing of pension reforms has to be in sync with the changing
profile of dependency ratio while addressing the fiscal challenges and
this needs to be seen from an overall perspective. In this regard,
pension reform in two Asian countries, namely India and China, is
discussed briefly.
India
In India, initiatives toward pension reforms have been somewhat
nascent at both the central and state government level (Box 2 and 3).
China
Old-age security is one of the first components of the social secu-
rity system in China to be selected for reform. Originally, China’s
social security system was designed to deliver many of the social serv-
ices and benefits to the population through state-owned enterprises.
In the process of reform of the social security system, government has
made clear the need to shift responsibility for providing social services
and benefits from enterprises to a combination of the government,
enterprises, community, and individuals.
The weaknesses and limitations of the old-age pension system
established in the 1950s became apparent as China shifted toward a
market-oriented economy in the early 1980s. The enterprise-based
system was increasingly unable to meet present obligations, and pay-
as-you-go financing clearly would be unsuitable to meet the challenge
of the next century with an aging population. Various reforms of the
pension system were under way on a trial basis in a number of cities
by the mid-1980s. Pension reform gained momentum in the early
1990s when experiments became more widespread, and social secu-
rity reform began to focus on expanded coverage and uniformity in
design details.
China has taken rapid strides in laying the foundation for a more
stable old-age security system. The new system includes multiple342 Rakesh Mohan
In February 2002, the High Level Expert Group on New Pension
System submitted its report suggesting modifications in the
pension system for central government employees. In August
2003, the Union Government approved the proposal to imple-
ment the budget announcement of 2003-04 relating to the
introduction of a new restructured defined contributory pension
system for new entrants to central government services, except to
armed forces. An independent Pension Fund Regulatory and
Development Authority have also been set up to regulate and
develop the pension market.
It is important to note that pension schemes for government
employees in India are non-contributory and unfunded. As such,
these are to be met through the government’s current revenues.
Traditional fiscal indicators based on cash flow accounting do not
capture the implications of pension liabilities. Hence, size of the
debt-based cash flow deficit does not fully reflect government’s
liabilities. Any realistic assessment of the fiscal situation would
also need to address the issue of pension liabilities.
In the context of the new contributory pension scheme for
central government employees, an important issue is funding of
existing pension liabilities and pension fund management. The
pension reforms announced for the central government employees
will yield positive returns only in the long run. During the transi-
tional period, the burden on the government finances will, in fact,
increase as the government will have to contribute to the pension
fund and also meet the pension liabilities of the existing employ-
ees and pensioners. This calls for some funding arrangement for
existing employees as well. Appropriate regulatory framework for
pension fund management is another important aspect crucial for
enhancing the credibility of the funded pension schemes.
Box 2
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At the state government level, the issue of increasing pension
liabilities has also assumed critical importance since their
unfunded and non-contributory nature has proved to be a
mounting burden on the state budgets. So far, however, only a
few state governments have initiated measures toward the intro-
duction of a contributory pension scheme. A Group to Study the
Pension Liabilities of the State Governments submitted its report in
February 2003, which was published in February 2004. 
Some of the major recommendations of the group are: intro-
duction of contributory pension scheme/s which should be
mandatory for all new employees of the state governments in
place of the existing non-contributory defined benefit pension
scheme. The recommended alternative pension models are: 
1. Pure  defined contribution (DC) scheme in which the new
employees and the government each would contribute 10
percent of the basic pay and dearness allowance to an individ-
ual account. The contributions will be vested in a fund,
which will be invested in accordance with specified guide-
lines. The employee at the time of retirement will get an
amount that will be the aggregate total of the employee’s
contribution, government’s (employer’s) contribution and the
earnings (on investment made by the fund) attributed to the
employee’s account;
2. A  defined contribution-defined benefit (DC-DB) scheme—a
contributory scheme with guarantee of an appropriate level of
pension fixed by individual State Governments; and 
3. A  two-tier scheme (for example, a DC-DB scheme plus a
second tier of DC scheme)—the defined benefit in the first
tier of DC-DB scheme could be reduced from the present
level of 50 percent to an appropriate level of say 30 percent 
Box 3
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pillars, although attention thus far has focused on the social or public
pillar. The financing burden is being shared by employees, employers,
and the government, rather than being borne exclusively by the indi-
vidual work unit. The framework is in place for a defined
contribution plan, which can become funded, and a defined benefit
plan, which may remain pay-as-you-go. Also, pensions are being
indexed to control the erosion of pension value by inflation.
Pension reform is incomplete, however, and a number of important
issues remain to be tackled. It is critical that regulations and supervi-
sion catch up with the new system. Contributors and beneficiaries
alike need to be assured that funds are properly managed. In addition,
if pension reform is to be successful, it is imperative that state-owned
enterprise reform proceeds. There are many aspects to state-owned
enterprise reform, including the establishment of unemployment
Box 3 (cont.)
and supplemented by a mandatory DC scheme, wherein
both the employees and the state governments make contri-
butions.
To have some immediate and medium-term effect on state
finances, a few parametric changes in the current pension scheme
for both the existing employees and pensioners become
inevitable. These include immediate withdrawal of fixing of
pensions on the basis of only last one month’s pay, wherever
applicable; eliminating wage indexation, wherever applicable; and
maximum permissible commutation amount to be brought down
from 40 percent of basic pension to 331⁄3 percent.
In order to at least partially meet the pension burden of the
existing employees and pensioners, there is a need for setting up
a “dedicated pension fund” through levying access on/collecting
contributions from all the existing employees, retaining a portion
of increased salary and dearness allowance (DA) arising from the
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insurance, housing reform, and a determination of how to value and
sell off state assets while preserving a portion of assets from bankrupt
enterprises to cover pension obligations. Delay in completing state-
owned enterprise reform runs the risk of the reformed pension system
unraveling if the current need to bail out state-owned enterprises and
excuse their pension contributions continues indefinitely. 
Growing pension liabilities, globally, have resulted in significant
reforms in pension schemes. Measures include the introduction of
higher retirement ages, increased employee contribution rates, lower-
ing benefit accrual rates, and changing the post retirement indexation
policy. A number of countries have also realized the need to achieve
some level of advance funding of benefit obligations. In Asia, pension
reforms can be characterized as diverse, ranging from the advanced
modern systems as prevalent in Singapore, Korea, and Malaysia to the
relatively less advanced systems in most other countries. In this
regard, medical and health insurance are quite comprehensive in the
east Asian countries. China and India have only recently embarked
on the path of pension reforms, although the coverage is still confined
to the organized sector. Medical insurance continues to be based on
private funding in India. Pension schemes have got to be from both
the public and private sector and, in this context, the development of
robust debt markets, in particular, and financial markets, in general,
is a necessary prerequisite that would facilitate the mobilization and
channeling of savings in high-return yielding assets. This, in turn,
would make pension funds viable and capable of withstanding the
economic pressures of population aging.  
Approach to Asian aging  VI
As in other parts of the world, Asia is also undergoing rapid aging
of its population as a result of much increased longevity in the lives
of most people. The emerging process will be similar to that being
observed in developed countries already, but the onset of fiscal pres-
sures will perhaps be delayed by 25 to 50 years in different Asian
countries. The existence of a large proportion of rural farm-based
populations, lower life expectancy, and the tradition of family support346 Rakesh Mohan
systems has so far masked the problems of aging in Asian countries.
With increasing urbanization, life expectancy, and breakdown of
family support systems, the pressures for public funding for health
care and support of the aged are bound to increase in Asia in the years
to come.
Among the key differences with the developed world are:
• Aging is taking place at much lower income levels and, hence,
capacity to fund social welfare is lower.
• There continue to be huge demands for funding of both physical
and social infrastructure in growing Asian economies.
• Some countries have constrained fiscal situations.
Our key advantage in Asia is that we know the future: We can see it
in the emerging demographic challenges of the developed countries.
What then are the lessons for us:
• Do active fiscal consolidation before these new fiscal challenges emerge.
• Pay serious attention to policy design for both health care and
pension/social security systems. As far as possible, reduce the weight
of defined benefit pension systems and move toward fully funded
systems or a judicious fiscally responsible combination of the two.
In the case of health, with vaulting technology, it is essential to
keep a strict watch on health costs and to design sustainable health
insurance systems with an eye to future aging related liabilities. 
• Pay attention to policy implications of aging: A key component of
this is to slow down the shift from private to public provision of
both social security and health care. Serious thought can be given
to appropriate incentive mechanisms that encourage family
provision caring of the aged. Social security systems in Asia are at
a formative stage, and care can be taken to not go the way of
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• Provide for flexibility: Although the demographic future is rela-
tively clear, unexpected economic and other changes do take
place. Thus, there is great need for building in flexibility in policy
design in terms of social security expenditure. As the total
dependency ratio is not projected to increase, the gradual trans-
formation to an aging population would imply a shift in social
security expenditure pattern from education to health care and
pensions. While expenditure on medical and health care would
be a mix of public and private expenditure, that on education
may have a greater component of private provision. Thus, policy
design will need to look ahead at the pattern of demographic
change in a detailed manner to provide for flexibility in the
public/private components of potential social expenditures.
• Focus on those who cannot help themselves: In view of the relatively
lower levels of incomes in Asian countries and fiscal constraints,
more care can be taken on focusing public social expenditures on
the relatively less well off, and avoid the perils of universal appli-
cability of social security. This would clearly imply a measure of
income redistribution: How much is feasible without significant
impact on savings and work behavior?
There are a number of positive features in the current Asian
economic scenario that can mitigate the expected fiscal challenges of
aging. Let me turn to some of them.
Role of migration and remittances
Remittances play a critical social insurance role and this has signif-
icant impact on both poverty and equity (Kapur 2003). Remittances
for some Asian countries, especially for south Asia, are very high,
constituting about 63 percent of total net inflows. Remittances
finance consumption, land and housing purchases, and philanthropy,
and they are an important source of social insurance in lower income
countries. The effects of remittances are complex and are a function
of the characteristics of migrants and the households they leave
behind, their motivations, and the overall economic environment. In348 Rakesh Mohan
Asian countries, particularly in the Indian subcontinent, remittances
are a steady source of resources at low-income levels, which are invari-
ant to market conditions.  As such, these flows seem to be unaffected
by changes in interest rates, country ratings, etc.
Projections show that the median age of developed countries would
be about 46 years around 2050. This is indicative of an aging popu-
lation, which is clearly unsustainable from the point of working-age
population. One solution for lowering the fiscal burden would be
either by encouraging large-scale migration or increases in existing
birth rates. Historical evidence, however, does not support the possi-
bility of higher fertility once fertility dips below replacement level.
Migration would facilitate the problem of aging in both the devel-
oped countries and the poorer ones. In developed countries, it would
add to the younger workforce, thereby increasing productivity, and
generate higher tax revenues and social security contributions. On the
other hand, continuous flow of remittances from migrant workers
would add to the private provisions supporting the old, thereby
reducing the fiscal burden of both the countries. It may be noted that
India and the Philippines have recorded relatively high remittances
during the last decade, which are now in excess of 3 percent of GDP
of these countries. 
Thus, migration has to be part of the aging story. It is good for
recipient countries, reducing dependency ratios, increases tax
resources, and increasing growth.
It is good for sending countries, reducing the pressure for job gener-
ation; a good source of funding for family retention of the old; and
good for on-the-job training.
Economic growth
Unlike developed countries, where economic growth is now
constrained by the limits to productivity growth, Asian countries will
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as incomes grow, India, Indonesia, and others will continue to exhibit
high savings rates. Second, as latecomers, technology adoption is
cheap; productivity improvement and consequent economic growth
can occur at a fast pace. But third, to get these benefits employment
generation is essential and a key problem for policy design. However,
it is continued high economic growth and savings rates that can do
much to enable Asian countries to provide for the fiscal challenges
that will emerge from aging.
Financial markets
If we are to avoid the trap of public provision of welfare except for
the needy, the development of a healthy privately funded system will
depend crucially on the adequate development of financial markets.
As financial savings increase and health, insurance, and pension funds
are to provide adequate returns, they need to be invested in produc-
tive activities providing adequate returns.
The first need is the maintenance of prudent macroeconomic
management, accompanied by monetary stability, with low and stable
inflation. Second, confidence in equity markets needs to be devel-
oped. Hence, there is a need for continued improvements in
regulation. Third, bond market development is in its infancy in Asia.
This needs to be nurtured and developed consciously to provide
adequate depth and breadth for fixed income instruments necessary
for investment of social security funds.
Infrastructure
We have great opportunities in this direction for the efficient inter-
mediation of funds for productive uses. The 21st century is Asia’s
urban century. Large resources will continue to be needed for differ-
ent segments of infrastructure: urban infrastructure, particularly
water, sanitation, and sewerage; power; ports; airports; railways;
roads; and the like. The telecom sector has provided an example of
private funding of infrastructure where appropriate financial return350 Rakesh Mohan
can lead to large and rapid investment. The levy and collection of
appropriate user charges is essential and a certain degree of financial
engineering, include public partnership, is required for providing
adequate and relatively large returns.
The current availability of high savings in Asian countries can there-
fore be married to the development of adequate financial and capital
markets to avoid the potential fiscal challenges of aging in Asia.
Low and sustainable inflation is key to macroeconomic stability.
Monetary authorities, by emphasizing price stability, can anchor infla-
tion expectations, thereby facilitating the emergence of a smooth term
structure of interest rates. This would not only strengthen monetary
and fiscal coordination but also develop the debt market. Thus, the
enduring message for the Asian countries is that they ought to adopt
an integrated policy framework on population aging covering demo-
graphic transition and reforms in the fiscal and financial sectors.
Conclusion
• Asian countries have the advantage of seeing what is happening
in the West.
• We can avoid the follies of excessive social welfare states.
• We need to develop funded health and pension schemes.
• We need to consciously delay the shift from private welfare 
provision to public welfare provision.
• The indications are that we will probably succeed.
Author’s note: The author is grateful to R. K. Pattnaik, Abhiman Das, Indranil Bhat-
tacharyya, and Partha Ray of the Reserve Bank of India for their assistance.Fiscal Challenges of Population Aging: The Asian Experience 351
Appendix
Concepts and Measures
Conceptually, population aging is different from individual aging.
Individual aging is a continuous process; a person ages inexorably
from the time of birth to the moment of death, whatever the form of
the life cycle or stages. Populations, however, can become older or
younger, depending on the age structure composition of the people.
The age of a population can be determined in several ways. Although
proportions of those aged 60 years and above are generally used as an
index of aging, there are several other measures of aging each having
its own advantages and disadvantages. Broadly, however, these are
categorized as traditional and alternative measures that are discussed,
in brief, in the following paragraphs. The various traditional measures
of population aging that are frequently used are the proportions of
persons aged 60 or 65 years and above, mean age, median age,
proportion of children under 15 years of age, and age-child ratio.
Among these, the most commonly used measure is the proportions
of aged 60 or 65 years and above due to its simplicity and easy
comprehensibility. This statistic measures aging through the propor-
tion of people aged 60 (or 65) and above in the total population. A
population is said to be aging when the proportion of people aged 65
plus is rising. According to the United Nations (UN), a 7 percent is
enough to make the population aged. Usually, the UN has recom-
mended the age of 60 as the age marking the onset of aging. The
second measure, the mean age of a population has been defined as the
number of persons in each age group, which, though theoretically
useful, has not been of much use. Third, the median age has been
defined as the exact age that divides the age distribution in two equal
halves. A typical aging population has its median age at 30 years or
more. When the median age varies between 20 and 29 years, a
country is in the intermediate stage of the aging process while a
median age below 20 years indicates a young population. The fourth
measure is the proportion of children under 15 years of age to the
total population. Any proportion below 30 is typically regarded as352 Rakesh Mohan
old. By this measure, India is projected to reach such a level by 2010.
Finally, the ratio of the number of elderly persons to the number of
children, called the aging index, is the fifth measure that takes into
account the size and changes at both ends of the age distribution. By
this measure, a value of over 30 indicates an aging population.
Besides the traditional measures, there are other dependency meas-
ures of aging. These measures are not used for measuring the aging of
population per se, but have been used as an approximation of the social
and economic dependency created by the aging of populations. Various
forms of this measure are: (1) old-age dependency ratio, (2) potential
support ratio, (3) parent support ratio, (4) youth dependency ratio and
(5) total dependency ratio. The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of
those aged 65 years and above to those aged between 15 and 64 years
of age. The potential support ratio is defined as the number of persons
aged 15-64 years per every person aged 65 years or older. The parent
support ratio is defined as the number of persons aged 85 years and
above per 100 people in the age bracket 50-64 years. The youth
dependency ratio is defined as the number of people aged 0 to 14 years
per 100 people in the age group of 15 to 64 years. Finally, the total
dependency ratio is the number of people under age 15 plus people
aged 65 or older per 100 people aged 15 to 64.
In contrast to these traditional measures, there are other alternative
measures that have been discussed in the theoretical literature. These
are (1) Ryder’s alternative measure, (2) P-Index of aging, and (3) slope
of the population pyramid. The first one proposed an alternative
measure by designating the entry into old age in terms of the number
of years remaining until death. Accordingly, old age is considered the
last 10 years of life. Under this criterion, the population of aged is the
proportion of people above the age corresponding to a life expectancy
of 10 years. Second, the P-Index of aging has been suggested to intro-
duce more refinements in aging estimation based on Sen’s P-Index of
Poverty, which takes into account both proportion of aged and extent
of oldness. Finally, the slope of the population pyramid has also been
used as a single summary index of population aging. As the slope
becomes steeper, the population is said to be aging. Despite the avail-Fiscal Challenges of Population Aging: The Asian Experience 353
ability of various alternative measures, the traditional measure of
proportion of aged population has been most commonly used in the
literature due to several reasons. First, while it is a convenient measure
for calculation, this technique is easily comprehensible. Additionally,
the internationally comparable aging data (for example, UN data) for
most countries is based on this method.   354 Rakesh Mohan
Endnotes:
1Following the UN classification, the aging indicator has been taken as 60 years
and above. 
2Japan and Republic of Korea have been excluded, as they are classified as OECD
countries.
3However, it must be recognized that the dependence ratio gives no more than a
rough approximation of the burden of dependency. Not all young and old people
require support, nor do all working-age people actually provide direct or indirect
support. On the contrary, older people in many societies are providers of support
to their adult children. Thus, although a useful indicator of trends in the level of
potential support needs, the dependency ratio, and particularly the old-age depend-
ency ratio, should be used cautiously (United Nations 2002).
4Since this categorization is done from the viewpoint of the fiscal impact of
population aging, this is different has been followed in Section III.
5The discussion in this section draws on Heller (1997) and West (1999). The
Indian experience is drawn from various reports on pension reforms.
6In China, the pressures begin to emerge in 2010, but become particularly severe
after 2025; In Indonesia, the civil service pension scheme begins to operate in
deficit after 2006 (Asher 1997), and the pressures are further exacerbated by liabil-
ities with respect to post-retirement health costs. In Korea, operating deficits
emerge after 2020, ultimately eliminating the financial reserves that will have been
accumulated. In Thailand, civil service pension deficits begin to emerge in 2020
and reserves have been projected to deplete by about 2027 (Heller 1997).Fiscal Challenges of Population Aging: The Asian Experience 355
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